James Wright v. Warden Forest SCI by unknown
2014 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
11-17-2014 
James Wright v. Warden Forest SCI 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2014 
Recommended Citation 
"James Wright v. Warden Forest SCI" (2014). 2014 Decisions. 1173. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2014/1173 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2014 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
  
CLD-024        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 14-1645 
___________ 
 
JAMES OSCAR WRIGHT, 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
WARDEN, FOREST SCI; ERIC TICE; Dep. Warden; 
MICHAEL OVERMYER, Dep. Warden;  
TED MORRISON, Safety Manager 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(W.D. Pa. Civil No. 1:12-cv-00217) 
Magistrate Judge:  Honorable Susan Paradise Baxter 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) 
or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
October 30, 2014 
Before:  FUENTES, GREENAWAY, JR. and VANASKIE, Circuit Judges  
 
(Filed: November 17, 2014) 
_________ 
 
OPINION* 
_________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 James Oscar Wright, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals from the order 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent. 
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dismissing his complaint.  We will affirm. 
 Wright, who is incarcerated at SCI-Forest in Marienville, Pennsylvania, filed a 
complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in September, 2012.  He alleged that he cut his 
forearm on a “razor sharp” shower door in March 2012 and that nothing had been done to 
fix the dangerous door.1  Wright filed a grievance.  In response, the SCI-Forest Safety 
Manager stated that a tradesman would be sent to remove any sharp edges found on the 
door.  Wright appealed.  In May 2012, an appeal decision was issued, upholding in part 
and denying in part Wright’s grievance.  Specifically, the grievance was upheld to the 
extent that sharp edges were found on the door.  But repairs were made, and the 
grievance was denied to the extent that Wright alleged that a hazardous situation existed 
throughout the institution and that the institution displayed willful neglect.  Wright then 
filed suit in District Court, seeking an injunction against retaliation and compensatory 
and punitive damages.  The parties consented to proceed before a United States 
Magistrate Judge, and the Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state 
                                              
1 The full extent of the allegations in the complaint are, verbatim: 
 
While showering on this day, I found myself in a unsafe environment in which while retrieving 
my soap that slipped out of my hand and under the steel shower onto the floor.  While retrieving 
the soap my right forearm came into contact with the bottom of said steel door which is razor 
sharp edge, which left me with a wound.  A cut across my forearm that required (5) stitches.  And 
today the situation is still the same! UNSAFE!  On 3-7-12 my grievance was reviewed 
investigation & review of policy & work practices work order system 2012 FRS-3346 for 
immediate removal.  Nothing has been done! 
 
Complaint at 3-4, Wright v. Sauers, et al., No. 12-cv-217 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 20, 2014), ECF No. 12. 
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a claim.  The motion was granted on the basis that Wright had failed to allege sufficient 
personal involvement by the Defendants.  The Magistrate Judge also concluded that  
amendment of the complaint would be futile.  This appeal followed. 
 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and exercise plenary review 
over the decision to grant the motion to dismiss.  Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 
(3d Cir. 2000).  When considering a motion to dismiss a complaint, a court must view the 
factual allegations as true and dismiss only if the complaint does not allege “enough facts 
to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”  Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 
U.S. 544, 570 (2007).  We may affirm on any ground supported by the record.  See 
Tourscher v. McCullough, 184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999). 
 A defendant in a section 1983 action “must have personal involvement in the 
alleged wrongs,” which can be shown by “allegations of personal direction.”  Rode v. 
Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988).  Wright’s allegation against 
Defendants Sauers, Tice, and Overmyer is that they had a “statutory duty to enforce 
policies” and govern the “conduct of their subordinates.”  Pl.’s Mot. in Opposition to 
Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss at 2-3, Wright v. Sauers, et al., No. 12-cv-217 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 20, 
2014), ECF No. 24.  He made a similar allegation against Defendant Morrison, the Safety 
Manager at SCI-Forest.  Id. at 3.  These allegations fail to suggest that the Defendants 
were personally involved in creating or maintaining the dangerous condition of the 
shower door.  Thus, Wright failed to plead facts that would, if proven, establish the 
Defendants’ liability under section 1983.   See Evancho v. Fisher, 423 F.3d 347, 353 (3d 
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Cir. 2005).  It appears that Wright relied on the supervisory role of the Defendants, but 
liability under section 1983 cannot be based solely on a theory of respondeat superior.  
See Rode, 845 F.2d at 1207. 
 To the extent that Wright alleged that Defendant Morrison, the Safety Manager, 
was personally involved because he responded to the grievance, we note that Wright did 
not allege that Morrison ignored dangerous conditions in the prison showers, or in some 
way acted or declined to act despite knowing there was a substantial risk of dangerous 
conditions in the showers.  See Barkes v. First Corr. Med., Inc., 766 F.3d 307, 320, 325 
(3d Cir. 2014).2  On the contrary, Wright alleged only that nothing was done in response 
to his grievance.  Courts are not required to credit such bald assertions when deciding a 
motion to dismiss.  Evancho, 423 F.3d at 354.  Accordingly, we agree with the Magistrate 
Judge’s conclusion that Wright failed to allege sufficient personal involvement by the 
Defendants to state a claim under section 1983.  
 On appeal, Wright draws our attention to the fact that he filed a motion to amend 
his complaint, which was denied by the Magistrate Judge.  To the extent he is arguing 
that the ruling was in error, we note that he filed the motion after the District Court 
dismissed his complaint and gave no indication of how he would remedy his deficient 
allegations.  Nor has he done so on appeal.  Furthermore, even if Wright could allege 
sufficient facts regarding the personal involvement of the Defendants, his claim is still 
                                              
2 The level of intent necessary to establish supervisory liability derives from the underlying constitutional tort 
alleged.  Barkes, 766 F.3d at 319.  To the extent that Wright made a prison conditions claim under the Eighth 
Amendment, he had to plead facts sufficient to allege that Morrison was deliberately indifferent to inmates’ health 
and safety.  See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994).  He failed to do so. 
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essentially one of mere negligence, which is not viable under section 1983.  See 
Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 347 (1986); Singletary v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 266 
F.3d 186, 193 n.2 (3d Cir. 2001).  No additional allegations regarding the shower door  
could cure the defects in Wright’s complaint, so amendment would have been  futile. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will summarily affirm the Magistrate Judge’s order 
dismissing Wright’s complaint.  In light of this disposition, we will deny the motion for 
appointment of counsel.  See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6. 
